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Microfinance institutions and efficiency 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are special financial institutions. They have both a social 
nature and a for-profit nature.  Their performance has been traditionally measured by means of 
financial ratios. The paper uses a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach to efficiency to 
show that ratio analysis does not capture DEA efficiency. 
 
Special care is taken in the specification of the DEA model.  We take a methodological 
approach based on multivariate analysis. We rank DEA efficiencies under different models and 
specifications; e.g., particular sets of inputs and outputs.  This serves to explore what is behind 
a DEA score.  
 
The results show that we can explain MFIs efficiency by means of four principal components 
of efficiency, and this way we are able to understand differences between DEA scores. It is 
shown that there are country effects on efficiency; and effects that depend on Non-
governmental Organization (NGO)/non-NGO status of the MFI.  
 
 
Keywords :  Microfinance, microcredit, DEA, multivariate analysis, efficiency. 
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Introduction 
 
Microcredit is the provision of small loans to very poor people for self-employment projects 
that generate income.  It is a new approach to fight poverty.  In its heart are new financial 
institutions, often non-profit organisations, whose aim is to serve those people who would not 
have access to a loan from a traditional trading bank.   
 
The fact that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) tend not to operate in the same way as 
traditional banks does not mean that they are not interested in profitability and efficiency 
issues. However, existing tools to assess the performance of traditional banking institutions 
may not be appropriate within this new context. 
 
How can we assess if a MFI is efficient?  How should we compare MFIs?  How far is existing 
knowledge on traditional financial institutions appropriate in order to understand the behaviour 
of MFIs?  These are the issues that are addressed in the current paper. 
 
The paper starts with a discussion of microcredit and its role in the fight of financial exclusion.  
Existing tools for the assessment of performance in MFIs are next reviewed and some lessons 
are drawn from this review.  It is suggested that Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is an 
appropriate tool for the assessment of MFI performance.  There is, however, an issue to be 
resolved: how should the DEA model be specified? Which inputs and which outputs should it 
contain?  A methodological approach based on multivariate analysis is applied in order to 
select appropriate model specifications, understand the way in which the relative efficiency of a 
MFI is determined by the choice of model, and to produce a ranking of MFIs in terms of 
efficiency.  The methodology is applied to the analysis of 30 Latin American microcredit 
institutions.  This is followed by a comparison between the procedure here described and 
traditional methods based on ratio analysis.  The paper ends with a concluding section that lists 
and discusses the findings. 
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Microcredit and Microfinance Institutions 
 
It has long been argued that commercial banks have not provided for the credit needs of 
relatively poor people who are not in a condition to offer loan guarantees but who have 
feasible and promising investment ideas that can result in profitable ventures; Hollis and 
Sweetman (1998).  Meeting this need is of interest to governments, charitable institutions, and 
socially responsible investors.  New financial institutions have arisen that are in touch with the 
local community, that can obtain information about the loan taker at low cost, and that often 
are not only interested in profit but also on the creation of jobs, women’ employment, 
development, and green issues.  These new financial intermediaries, the MFIs, provide small 
loans to poor people who can offer little or no collateral assets.  But the provision of such 
microcredit is not limited to not-for-profit organisations.  Traditional financial institutions can, 
and often do, make loans to the deprived as part of a socially responsible investment policy.   
 
The best known innovation arising from microfinance programs is peer group loan 
methodology, in which members accept joint liability for the individual loans made.  This joint 
responsibility approach results in low levels of default, but there are other reasons for 
successful repayment rates: dynamic incentives, regular repayment schedules and collateral 
substitutes; Morduch (1999). 
 
Microcredit institutions have mushroomed in countries with less developed financial systems.  
The Microcredit Summit Campaign formed by donors, policymakers and more than 2500 
MFIs, claimed to have helped 41.6 million of the poorest people around the world by 31 
December 2002 (Daley-Harris, 2003). Their goal is to reach 100 million of the world poorest 
families by 2005. Moreover, the United Nations declared 2005 as the Year of Microcredit. 
 
According to Von Pischke (2002), modern microcredit evolved from its origins in the mid 
1970s to the present day from some organisations that offered loans and savings to individuals 
at the margins of the financial markets.  Some examples of microcredit initiatives are: FINCA 
and ACCION International, two US organisations whose area of activity is Latin America; the 
 6 
rural units of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), one of the few institutions that receive no 
subsidies; and Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, now acting in more than 50 countries. 
 
 
Assessing microcredit institutions 
 
Microcredit emerges as a new approach to fight poverty. But, is the money lent by MFIs 
efficiently managed? There is much literature on bank efficiency, but very little on microfinance 
efficiency.  Should we assess microfinance institutions efficiency the way banks do, taking into 
account financial inputs and outputs?  This tends not to be the case: Morduch (1999) observes 
that discussions on microcredit performance almost ignore financial matters. 
 
Yaron (1994) suggested a framework, based on the dual concepts of outreach and 
sustainability, that has became popular in the assessment of MFIs performance; Navajas et al. 
(2000), Schreiner and Yaron (2001). Outreach accounts for the number of clients serviced 
and the quality of the products provided. Sustainability implies that the institution generates 
enough income to at least repay the opportunity cost of all inputs and assets; Chaves and 
González-Vega (1996).  It is difficult to think of a sustainable MFI with poor financial 
management; Johnson and Rogaly (1997).  Sustainability has two levels: operational and 
financial (see, for example CGAP, 2003).  
 
Microfinance industry evolution stresses more and more the importance of financial viability. A 
set of performance indicators has arisen, and many of them have become standardized, but 
there is by no means general agreement on how to define and calculate them. A consensus 
group composed of microfinance rating agencies, donors, multilateral banks and private 
voluntary organizations agreed in 2003 some guidelines on definitions of financial terms, ratios 
and adjustments for microfinance (CGAP, 2003). The ratios fall into four categories: 
sustainability/profitability, asset/liability management, portfolio quality, and 
efficiency/productivity. These measures derive from the financial ratio analysis implemented in 
conventional financial institutions. In what follows, we will concentrate on efficiency ratios.  
Table 1 shows a list of 21 ratios issued by Microrate, used to assess the performance of MFIs 
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and their definitions.  These are grouped in terms of portfolio quality, efficiency and 
productivity, financial management, profitability, productivity and others.  Table 2 shows the 
values of these ratios in 30 Latin American MFIs. 
 
Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
 
The efficiency/productivity ratios reflect “how efficiently an MFI is using its resources, 
particularly its assets and personnel” (CGAP, 2003).  Thus, efficiency ratios compare a 
measure of personnel employed with a measure of assets.  Institutions can choose as assets 
either average gross loan portfolio, or average total assets, or average performing assets.  
CGAP describes as performing assets “loans, investments, and other assets expected to 
produce income”. Personnel may be defined as the total number of staff employed or the 
number of loan officers.   In this paper we are going to use a different definition of efficiency, 
based on DEA, and we will compare traditional ratio based measures with DEA efficiencies.  
It will be shown that they are not the same thing, and that  ratio analysis is no substitute for 
efficiency analysis as defined by the micro economic theory of production functions. 
 
 
DEA efficiency and financial institutions 
 
The efficiency with which financial institutions conduct their business has long been studied.   
Efficiency assessment is based on the theory of production functions.  The standard definition 
of efficiency is due to Pareto-Koopman; see Thanassoulis (2001).  There are two main 
approaches to efficiency assessment: parametric frontiers and Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA).  Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide a comprehensive review of methods and 
models up to 1997.  This subject has continued to interest researchers up to the present date; 
some recent papers on efficiency and financial institutions are Athanassopoulos (1997), Bala 
and Cook (2003), Brockett et al. (2004), Dekker and Post (2001), Hartman et al. (2001), 
Kuosmanen and Post (2001), Luo (2003), Pille and Paradi (2002), Paradi and Schaffnit 
(2003), Pastor et al. (1997), Saha and Ravisankar (2000), Seiford and Zhu (1999), and 
Worthington (2004).  The literature continues to grow all the time. 
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One advantage of DEA (nonparametric) over parametric approaches to measure efficiency is 
that this technique can be used when the conventional cost and profit functions cannot be 
justified; Berger and Humphrey (1997).  DEA performs multiple comparisons between a set 
of homogeneous units.  For an introduction to the theory of DEA see Thanassoulis (2001), 
Charnes et al. (1994), or Cooper et al. (2000).  
 
For the purposes of this paper, it will be useful to make a distinction between model and 
specification in a DEA context.  Different philosophical approaches as to what a financial 
institution does, and what is meant by efficiency lead to different models; see Berger and 
Mester (1997) for a full discussion.  Two basic models are prevalent in the literature: 
intermediation and production; Athanassoupoulos (1997).  Specification will refer to a more 
restricted concept: the particular set of inputs and outputs that enter into model definition. 
 
Under the intermediation model, financial institutions collect deposits and make loans in order 
to make a profit.  Deposits and acquired loans are considered to be inputs.  Institutions are 
interested in placing loans, which are traditional outputs in studies of this kind; see, for example 
Berger and Humphrey (1991).  Under the production model, a financial institution uses 
physical resources such as labour and plant in order to process transactions, take deposits, 
lend funds, and so on.  In the production model manpower and assets are treated as inputs 
and transactions dealt with -such as deposits and loans- are treated as outputs.  See, for 
example, Vassiloglou and Giokas (1990), Schaffnit et al. (1997), Soteriou and Zenios (1999). 
 
We notice that the selection of inputs and outputs is determined by our understanding of what 
a financial institution does.  Deposits provide an extreme example: they are inputs from an 
intermediation point of view, and outputs from a production point of view.  The specification of 
what is an input and what is an output is crucial in the modelling process.  In our particular 
case we do not need to ponder about the way in which deposits should be treated, since 
microfinance institutions do not always collect them, and had to be excluded as a possible 
variable in the data set since the technique to be applied, DEA, requires homogeneous data for 
all the MFIs.  Many MFIs obtain funds from the market (loans) or receive grants.  Other 
 9 
issues become relevant in the selection of inputs and outputs.  For example, some MFI receive 
subsidised loans at an interest rate that is below the market. 
 
It follows that the selection of inputs and outputs is crucial in the financial institution modelling.  
Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest that one could assess efficiency under a variety of 
output/input specifications, and see the way in which calculated efficiencies change as the 
specification changes.  This is sensible, but they do not provide guidelines on how to choose 
between specifications.  In fact, specification searches are common in the modelling of financial 
institutions; examples are Oral and Yolalan (1990), Vassiloglou and Giokas (1990), and 
Pastor and Lovell (1997). 
 
A major problem with the selection of inputs and outputs in a DEA model is that there is no 
statistical framework on which significance tests can be based.  The neat approach of variable 
selection that is used in regression, based on t statistic values, has no parallel in DEA.  One 
may be tempted to use as many inputs and outputs as one may think to be relevant, but some 
of them will be correlated, perhaps highly so.  Parkin and Hollingsworth (1997) review the 
problems that variable selection creates in DEA.  Jenkins and Anderson (2003) warn against 
the use of correlated inputs and outputs in a DEA model.  An important issue is that the 
number of 100% efficient units increases with the number of inputs and outputs in the model, 
and adding irrelevant variables may change the results obtained; Dyson et al. (2001), Pedraja 
Chaparro et al. (1999).  Specification search methods in DEA have been proposed by 
Norman and Stocker (1991), Pastor et al. (2002), and Serrano Cinca and Mar Molinero 
(2004).  
 
Here we will use the model specification methodology suggested by Serrano Cinca and Mar 
Molinero (2004).  This, in essence, consists in calculating efficiencies for every possible 
combination of inputs and outputs.  A two way table is obtained in which the columns are 
output/input specifications and the rows are decision units (MFIs).  The entries in the table are 
the efficiencies obtained under each different model for each MFI.  The rows of this table are 
treated as cases and the columns as variables in a bivariate statistical analysis which throws 
light on the similarity between models, extreme observations, and the reasons why a particular 
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MFI achieves a particular level of efficiency with a particular specification.  This will be 
discussed in detail in the empirical example presented below. 
 
 
Microfinance in Latin America 
 
Most of the research on banking efficiency has concentrated on US and developed countries. 
So far, neither DEA nor other parametric or non-parametric frontier techniques have been 
used to evaluate the efficiency of microfinance institutions.  Here we depart from this trend, 
and analyse thirty Latin American MFIs from Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Salvador.  Some of them are for profit institutions and 
others are not profit oriented.  Some MFIs are just specialised banking institutions, while 
others are Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).  The question arises of whether this 
difference influences efficiency, or the way in which efficiency is achieved. 
 
According to Miller (2003), some of the most experienced, developed, and diverse MFIs 
around the world can be found in Latin America. Using 2001 and 2002 data from 124 
worldwide MFIs (provided by the MicroBanking Bulletin), almost half of them from Latin 
America, the author draws several conclusions: MFIs from this region have more assets, are 
more leveraged, and make use of an increasingly growing share of commercial funds than 
institutions from other regions. Lapenu and Zeller (2002) complete this vision: comparing 
African, Asian and Latin America MFIs, they find that the number of institutions and the 
number of clients remain small in Latin American MFIs compared to Asian. However, Latin 
American MFIs mobilise a good amount of savings and loans in comparison to Asian MFIs. 
Finally, Latin America records the largest volume per transaction although rural outreach 
remains low. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, data was obtained from Microrate web page for the year 
2003, and completed with the Technical Guide prepared by Jansson et al. (2003). All the 
data is measured in monetary units (thousand of dollars), except the number of credit officers 
and the number of loans outstanding.  
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Selection of inputs and outputs 
 
The selection of inputs and outputs in the model was based on Yaron’s (1994) outreach and 
sustainability framework.  The number of loans outstanding (output) and the gross loan 
portfolio (output) were selected as measures of outreach.  The two aspects of sustainability, 
operational and financial, guided the selection of a further input and output.  Interest and fee 
income (output) was taken as an indicator of operational sustainability, as a MFI that fails to 
collect enough income is not viable in the long term.  Financial sustainability was captured 
through operating expenses.  In essence, the collection of fee and interest income is necessary 
for survival, but such survival cannot be long lasting if this income is collected at high cost.  In 
common with other similar studies, the number of credit officers was also used as an input.   
 
The inputs selected in this study are credit officers and operating expenses.  A production 
model would suggest the inclusion of the first input, while the second input is consistent with an 
intermediation model. Jansson et al. (2003) define loan officers as “personnel whose main 
activity is direct management of a portion of the loan portfolio”. Our choice of input could have 
been total staff, but this would have included people whose activity is unrelated to the MFI 
activity. The number of employees has been proposed as an input by Berger and Humphrey 
(1997), Dekker and Post (2001), Desrochers and Lamberte (2003), Leon (1999), and 
Tortosa-Ausina (2001) among others. Operating expenses –or similar inputs have been 
suggested by Berger and Humphrey (1997), Cuadras-Morató et al. (2001), Laeven (1999), 
Pastor (1999) and Worthington (1998). Operating expenses are “expenses related to the 
operation of the institution, including all the administrative and salary expenses, depreciation 
and board fees”; Jansson et al. (2003). 
 
The selection of outputs is also consistent with the production and intermediation models. 
Interest and fee income and the gross loan portfolio are associated with an intermediation 
orientation, whereas the number of loans outstanding is associated with a production 
orientation. We wish to emphasize that the gross loan portfolio and the number of loans 
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outstanding appeared as components of MFI efficiency ratios in Table 1. Interest and fee 
incomes are used by Pastor (1999). Gross loan portfolio or similar measures are often 
mentioned: Berger and Humphrey (1997), Desrochers and Lamberte (2003), Laeven (1999), 
Lozano-Vivas (1998), Leon (1999), Tortosa-Ausina (2001), and Worthington (1998). 
Finally, the number of loans outstanding is mentioned by Berger and Humphrey (1997), 
Budnevich et al. (2001) and Tortosa-Ausina (2001). As there is some difficulty in getting data 
for the number of loans processed in a given period, we use instead the stock of loans. Table 
4 gives the values of inputs and outputs for the MFIs in the sample1. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
 
Specifications and DEA efficiencies 
 
Notation is needed to simplify the discussion of the various specifications.  Inputs are referred 
to by means of capital letters, in such a way that the first input (credit officers) is represented 
by the letter A, and the second input (operating expenses) by the letter B.  Outputs are 
referred to by means of numbers.  The first output (interest and fee income) is associated with 
number 1, the second output (gross loan portfolio) with number 2, and the third output 
(number of loans outstanding) with number 3.  In this way a specification that treats a MFI as 
an institution whose credit officers (input A) take interest and fee income (output 1) and place 
a number of loans in the market (output 3) would be labeled A13.  If this specification is 
augmented with operating expenses (input B) and gross loan portfolio (output 2), the 
specification becomes AB123.  An intermediation model would be described by a 
specification such as B2.  Under the specification B2, a MFI is an institution that spends 
money to build a loan portfolio.  Of course, this is just a performance indicator, EP1 in Table 
1, relating operating expenses to gross loan portfolio, contained in the list recommended by the 
consensus group of rating agencies, donors, banks, and voluntary organizations. 
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Other views of the way in which a MFI operates can be generated by using different 
combinations of inputs and outputs.  Efficiency ratios are a particular case obtained when only 
one input and only one output enter into the specification.  It is, of course, possible to think of 
all possible combinations of inputs and outputs.  The total number of possible specifications 
with two inputs and three outputs is 21.  The complete list of specifications can be seen in 
Table 5. 
DEA efficiencies for each MFI were calculated using the CCR model of constant returns to 
scale; Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978).  The results are given in Table 5. 
Table 5 about here 
 
Visual examination of Table 5 reveals some important features. Two MFIs (W-Popayan, an 
NGO and Findesa, a non-bank financial institution) are 100% efficient under many 
specifications. On the other side, some MFI achieve low scores under most specifications.  
No MFI is efficient under all specifications, highlighting the fact that the selection of inputs and 
outputs and, therefore, the view of what constitutes efficiency in this sector is a matter of 
importance. If we take, for example, W-Popayan, we find that it is 100% efficient under 18 
specifications, meaning that it is an excellent institution, but its efficiency drops below 30% 
under A1, A2 and A12.  We conclude that W-Popayan is good in any specification that 
contains either input B or output 3, indicating that this MFI is good at generating lots of loans 
with low operating expenses.  A counter example is Fie, a non-bank financial institution, 
whose scores tend to be low, but becomes 100% efficient under 4 specifications: AB12, 
AB123, AB2, AB23. This indicates that, although Fie can take action to improve its 
efficiency, it has some strong points that deserve further attention. 
 
In summary, the level of efficiency achieved by a particular MFI depends on the specification 
chosen, indicating that specification search is delicate and important.  In addition, if two MFIs 
achieve the same efficiency score under a given specification they may do so following very 
different patterns of behaviour: there is no single path to efficiency in MFI.  Exploring what is 
behind a DEA score is the objective of the next sections. 
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Multivariate analysis of DEA efficiency results 
 
Serrano Cinca and Mar Molinero (2004) propose a specification search methodology based 
on treating the data in Table 5 as a multivariate data set.  Other examples of the use of this 
approach are Serrano Cinca et al. (2004a), and Serrano Cinca et al. (2004b).  This involves 
treating specifications as variables and MFIs as cases in a Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA).  For an account of PCA see, for example, Chatfield and Collins (1980). 
 
The first principal component, accounting for 57% of the variance, has an associated 
eigenvalue of 12.1; the second component accounts for a further 18% of the variance with an 
associated eigenvalue of 3.8; the third component, in turn accounts for 15% of the variance 
with an eigenvalue of 3.1; finally, there is only one more eigenvalue greater than 1, at 1.3, 
accounting for 6.4% of the variance.  In total, the first four principal components account for 
97% of the variance. This suggests that only four numbers (components) are required to 
explain why a particular MFI achieves a certain level of efficiency under all specifications.   
 
Component correlations are shown in Table 6.  It can be seen that the first principal 
component (PC1) is positively and highly correlated with efficiency under all specifications, 
suggesting that it provides an overall measure of efficiency that could be seen as an average 
over all specifications.  The meaning of the remaining components could be assessed in the 
same way, just looking at the values in the columns in Table 6, but we prefer a more graphical 
approach to interpretation based on component scores.  Each MFI is associated with four 
components, and this forces us to work with projections on to pairs of components.  
Component scores for each MFI in principal components 1 and 2 can be seen in Figure 1, and 
component loadings in principal components 2 and 3 can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Figure 1 about here 
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Figure 2 about here 
 
If we look at Figure 1 while taking into account the numbers in Table 5, some interesting 
features appear.  W-Popayan, Findesa, C-Cusco, that are efficient under many specifications, 
appear at the right hand side of the figure.  At the other extreme of the figure we find MFIs 
such as Cr-Arequipa and Fincomun, that achieve low levels of efficiency under most 
specifications.  This is in line with our observation that the first principal component provides an 
overall rating in terms of efficiency.  We could approach the understanding of the remaining 
components in a similar vein.  For example, the second component appears to be associated 
with Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) status, as all the MFIs with a positive score in 
this component are NGOs, and all the MFIs with a negative value of the component, with the 
exception of Nieborowski, are non-NGOs.  Towards the top of Figure 2 we find MFIs whose 
efficiency is higher under specifications that contain input A (credit officers) than under 
specifications that contain input B (operating expenses).  The most extreme example is 
Findesa.  Findesa is 100% efficient under all models that contain input A, but its efficiency 
drops considerably when this input is excluded.  This would suggest that the third principal 
component is associated with the efficient use of input A versus the efficient use of input B.  
However, it is dangerous to perform this type of labelling exercise without the help of a formal 
tool.  In order to interpret the meaning of the components and in order to highlight the 
information contained in the figures, we resort to the technique of Property Fitting (Pro-Fit). 
 
Pro-Fit is a regression-based technique that draws lines in the figures in much the same way in 
which North-South directions are drawn in order to orient a geographical map.  A particular 
characteristic of a MFI is taken as a property.  A line is drawn pointing in the direction 
towards the value of the property increases.  For example, in Figure 1, if we calculate the 
efficiency of the various MFIs under specification B3, we find that W-Popayan is associated 
with the highest value, while Fincomun and Bancosol show the lowest values.  B3 efficiency 
takes intermediate values in the remaining MFIs, increasing as we approach W-Popayan and 
decreasing as we approach Bancosol.  Thus, a line from the origin towards W-Popayan, and 
away from Bancosol, would provide an indication of how B3 efficiency changes within Figure 
1.  A good introduction to Pro-Fit can be found in Schiffman et al. (1981).  For some 
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examples of the use of Pro-Fit within a management science context see Mar Molinero and 
Serrano Cinca (2001) and Serrano Cinca et al (2004a).  
 
Pro-Fit lines have been calculated for all the specifications and displayed in Figures 1 and 2.  
Goodness of fit statistics associated with the Pro-Fit lines is given in Table 7.  Figures 1 and 2 
will now be interpreted in the light of the information contained in the directional vectors. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
The first principal component has already been identified as an overall measure of efficiency 
that summarises all the models.  This can be clearly seen in Figure 1, where all the lines 
associated with the different specifications are at acute angles with the horizontal axis, 
indicating positive correlation between the value of the first component score for each MFI 
and efficiency, in whatever specification efficiency is measured.  In Figure 1, the label “global 
efficiency” has been attached to the first component. 
 
The second principal component has been already interpreted as being related to NGO status, 
and this is clear in Figure 2 where the shaded area contains all the MFIs with NGO status. 
 
We observe in Figure 2 that specifications that contain input A in their definitions are 
associated with directional vectors that point upwards, while specifications that contain input B 
in their definition are associated with downward pointing directional vectors.  The third 
principal component clearly reflects the different strategies followed by MFIs in their search 
for efficiency, opposing those that follow a policy of being efficient in the use of credit officers- 
positive values of the third principal component- and those that follow a policy of being 
efficient in their operating expenses – negative values of the third principal component.  In 
Figure 2 we also see that Findesa can be considered to be a discordant observation.  Indeed, 
Findesa is an extreme case of performance related pay, since 99% of credit officers’ salary is 
due to incentive pay, and this is reflected in our results.  
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Principal Component 4 was found to be associated with input 2- gross loan portfolio.  
Specifications that contain output 2 in their definition produce vectors that point towards the 
negative end of the fourth principal component, while specifications that exclude this output 
produce vectors that point towards the positive side.  This is sending the message that the 
inclusion or exclusion of this output affects efficiency values. 
 
In summary, when describing a MFI from the point of view of efficiency, we need to refer to 
at least four characteristics, or principal components of efficiency.  The first principal 
component refers to an overall assessment of efficiency under all possible models, and gives a 
ranking of MFIs.  The second component refers to the NGO status.  The third principal 
component is associated with inputs and reveals which MFIs have an approach to efficiency 
based on credit officers, and which ones approach efficiency by concentrating on operating 
expenses.  The fourth principal component is associated with the inclusion or exclusion of an 
output in the model: gross loan portfolio.   
 
Returning to the difference between W-Popayan and Findesa, that was earlier mentioned, we 
are now in a position to see in which way these two institutions are different.  In Figure 1 we 
see that both W-Popayan and Findesa are at the extreme right hand side of the first principal 
component, indicating that both are fully efficient in an overall assessment. W-Popayan, is 
towards the top of this figure, at the extreme of vector A3, indicating that W-Popayan places a 
high number of loans per credit officer, while Findesa is at the extreme of vector B1, indicating 
that with little operating expenses obtains a great deal of interest and fee income.  But is in 
Principal Component 3 where the difference appears most clearly.  W-Popayan is at the 
bottom of Figure 2 indicating efficient use of credit officers, while Findesa is located towards 
the top of the same figure, indicating efficient use of operating expenses.  Both W-Popayan 
and Findesa achieve similar scores with respect to Principal Component 4. 
Non-governmental organisations and country effect 
 
Two aspects of MFIs will now be examined: their country of operation, and their non-
governmental (NGO) status.  We will start with the NGO status. 
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Given the aims and objectives of MFIs - the fight against poverty, self-help, and the promotion 
of women’s status -, it is not surprising to discover that many of them are NGOs.  In fact, very 
often an organisation starts as an NGO, and when it becomes well established in the 
microfinance world, changes into a non-banking financial institution.  But are NGOs more or 
less efficient than non-NGOs MFIs?  Is there anything in the way they achieve efficiency that 
distinguishes them? 
 
A region has been highlighted in Figure 2.  This region contains only NGO institutions and 
does not contain any institution that is not NGO.  MFIs outside this region are all non-NGOs.  
It is clear that, from the point of view of efficiency there is something that distinguishes a NGO 
MFI.  Looking further into Figure 2, we see that the profit line B3 points directly towards the 
cluster of NGO MFIs and away from the rest of the MFIs.  This suggests that NGOs try to 
make a large number of loans and operate as cheaply as possible.  This is very much in tune 
with this type of organisation, since they tend to be operated by volunteers to keep costs 
down, and aim at supporting as many individuals as possible.  The specifications that are most 
in tune with non-NGO institutions are A1, A12, and A2.  Non-NGOs, therefore, rely on their 
specialised staff to build a profitable portfolio of loans, very much like commercial banks 
would do.  The difference is not in the way they view the financial business but in their attitude 
towards obtaining guarantees for their loans and, indeed, in the average size of loans.  It is to 
be noticed that the most extreme point in the non-NGO region of Figure 2 is Bancosol, a 
commercial bank that is involved in the microfinance business. 
 
We now turn our attention to the country effect.  There is a country effect, best seen in 
Principal Component 4.  Figure 3 plots component scores in principal component 1 versus 
principal component 4.  The names of the MFIs have been replaced with the names of the 
countries in which MFIs operate.  We can see that there is very little overlap between the 
countries.  From top to bottom, all Nicaraguan MFIs appear together; all but one Peruvian 
MFIs appear together; all but one Colombian MFIs appear together; and all Bolivian MFIs 
appear together.  Nothing can be said about Salvador, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic, 
since these countries are represented by just one MFI each.  There is no right to left grouping 
of countries in Figure 3, indicating that country of origin and overall efficiency are unrelated.  
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Remembering that Principal Component 4 is associated with output 2 (gross loan portfolio), 
one would conclude that efficiency of MFIs in Bolivia is associated with building large 
portfolios, while efficiency of MFIs in Nicaragua has to be assessed in terms of the number of 
loans or the amount of interests and fees collected by the MFI. In fact, Bolivia has one of the 
more developed microfinance markets, where margins are narrowing and this is resulting in 
mergers and acquisitions within the MFI industry, Silva (2003). 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
 
DEA efficiency and ratio analysis 
 
Up to now we have been working with DEA efficiency.  We have been able to rate MFIs in 
terms of overall DEA efficiency; we have seen that there are effects associated with NGO 
status; and we have observed country effects.  The question remains of what the DEA analysis 
adds to our knowledge of microfinance institutions?  Have we observed effects that would 
have remained hidden if we had used traditional ratio analysis?  This will be the object of the 
current section. 
 
Traditional ratios used to assess a MFI institution have been discussed in a previous section, 
their definitions given in Table 1, and their values are shown in Table 2. 
 
It is clear that there is redundancy in a set of 21 ratios, and that it should be possible to use a 
smaller number of factors in order to describe what is special about a given MFI.  For this 
reason, ratios have been treated as variables and MFIs as observations and principal 
component analysis has been performed.  Seven principal components were found to be 
associated with eigenvalues greater than one, accounting for 79% of the total variance in the 
data.   
 
We have now reasoned as follows.  Seven factors are needed to describe a MFI from the 
point of view of ratio analysis.  Some of these factors are probably related to efficiency, in 
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whatever form this is defined.  Indeed, ratios EP1 to EP4 are known in the trade as “efficiency 
and productivity ratios”.  If efficiency is captured by the ratios, there will be at least one 
principal component that reflects efficiency.  Of course, this definition of efficiency does not 
have to coincide with DEA efficiency, but one expects that if a MFI is efficient from the point 
of view of ratio analysis, it will also be efficient from the DEA point of view.  The fact that 
some DEA specifications coincide with ratio definitions make us think that the two approaches 
will be related.  But in this paper we have shown how to define a measure of overall efficiency 
taking into account all possible specifications. Does ratio analysis capture in any way such 
measure of overall efficiency? 
 
To answer this question we have computed Pearson correlation coefficients between 
component scores obtained from the ratios in Table 2, and principal components obtained 
from efficiency scores in Table 5.  These are summarised in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
We can see in Table 8 that the first DEA principal component, the measure of overall 
efficiency, is significantly correlated with the second and the third principal components of the 
ratios.  The second DEA principal component, NGO status, is associated with the first 
principal component of the ratios.  The third DEA principal component, which in our case is 
related to efficient use of inputs, is not reflected in the principal components of the ratios.  
Finally, the fourth DEA principal component, which is associated with the country effect, is 
correlated with the second and the third principal components of the ratios.  If we look at 
component correlations, not shown here, we find that the first principal component of the 
ratios is correlated with EP3 (number of borrowers per staff), EP4 (number of borrowers per 
credit officer), FM3 (debt/equity ratio), O1 (average loan balance per client) and O3 
(equity/assets ratio); the second principal component of the ratios is correlated with EP1 
(operating expense ratio), FM1 (funding expense ratio), FM2 (cost of funds ratio), and 
Prd1(Personnel expense/average gross portfolio).  Of all efficiency ratios, only EP1 appears to 
be associated with the overall measure of DEA efficiency, and its effect is relatively low, as the 
correlation of EP1 with the first principal component of the ratios is 0.75, and the correlation 
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of the second principal component of the ratios with the first principal component of DEA 
efficiencies is -0.53.  We have to conclude that efficiency and productivity ratios are only 
vaguely related to efficiency from the DEA point of view. What are we to conclude?  DEA 
efficiency is well based on Economic Theory, while ratios are only consensus indicators.  
Everyone can make up his/her own mind, but we lean towards DEA efficiency. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
DEA has long been applied to the measurement of financial institutions efficiency. Here we 
have used it to assess efficiency of MFIs, which have a banking side and a social side. We 
have suggested a methodological approach that goes behind a DEA measure and explains the 
scores obtained under different choices of models and specifications. 
 
We have obtained DEA efficiencies for every combination of inputs and outputs of 30 Latin 
American MFIs. This way, we can see that the level of efficiency achieved by a MFI depends 
on the specification chosen. So the choice of a particular model or specification is relevant for 
efficiency assessment.  
 
We have then followed a multivariate approach on efficiencies obtained through DEA: we 
have combined Principal Component Analysis with Property Fitting. We have obtained four 
principal components of efficiency, each one related to a different issue: overall efficiency, 
NGO status, input choice and output choice. This way we can understand why a MFI 
achieves a level of efficiency under a given specification, or which are the paths to efficiency 
followed by a group of MFIs.  
 
Finally, there is no reason why we should be fanatic believers in a DEA efficiency world, but 
the converse is also true. Efficiency and productivity ratios that have emerged from the 
deliberations of a committee need not be associated with efficiency nor with productivity.  We 
have shown that our approach to efficiency analysis not only produces an overall ranking of 
MFIs in terms of the use they make of inputs and outputs, but also reveals features that 
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distinguish NGOs from non-NGO institutions, that we can explain the reasons why some 
MFIs are or are not efficient, and that there are country effects in the data.  
 
We finish by encouraging analysts, rating agencies, and users to go beyond ratio analysis in 
MFIs and incorporate measures of efficiency based on Data Envelopment Analysis. 
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PQ1 portfolio at risk = portfolio at risk / gross loan portfolio 
PQ2 provision expense ratio = loan loss provision expense / average portfolio 
PQ3 risk coverage ratio = loan loss reserves / portfolio at risk 
PQ4 write-off ratio = write offs / average portfolio 
EP1 operating expense ratio = operating expenses / gross loan portfolio 
EP2 cost per client = operating expenses / average number of clients 
EP3 personnel productivity = number of borrowers per staff 
EP4 credit officer productivity = number of active borrowers / number of credit officers 
FM1 funding expense ratio = interest and fee expense / average gross portfolio 
FM2 cost of funds ratio = interest and fee expenses on funding liabilities / average funding liabilities 
FM3 debt/equity ratio = total liabilities / total equity 
P1 return on equity = net income / average equity 
P2 return on assets = net income/ average assets 
P3 portfolio yield = cash financial revenue / average gross portfolio 
Prd1 personnel expense/average gross portfolio 
Prd2 credit officers/total personnel 
Prd3 incentive pay as % of base salary 
Prd4 percent of staff with <12 months 
O1 average loan balance per client 
O2 current assets/current liabilities 
O3 equity/assets 
 
Table 1.  The 21 ratios and their definitions 
 
PQ: Portfolio Quality; EP: Efficiency and Productivity; FM: Financial Management; P: 
Profitability; Prd: Productivity; O: Other 
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DMU PQ1 PQ2 PQ3 PQ4 EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 FM1 FM2 FM3 P1 P2 P3 Prd1 Prd2 Prd3 Pr4 O1 O2 O3 
Adopem 0.037 0.02 1.025 0.002 0.155 387.789 226 431 0.047 0.136 0.8 0.007 0.003 35.7 0.076 0.526 0.8 0.229 191 4.7 0.509 
Andes 0.06 0.035 1.161 0.014 0.137 189.492 69 248 0.026 0.054 10 0.33 0.03 0.258 0.087 0.276 0.237 0.162 1451 1.9 0.086 
Bancosol 0.12 0.045 0.726 0.013 0.132 210.876 74 239 0.028 0.054 5.6 0.049 0.007 0.223 0.068 0.311 0.389 0.222 2008 2.1 0.148 
Calpia 0.031 0.034 1.393 0.003 0.19 205.556 136 360 0.018 0.04 5 0.17 0.028 0.276 0.091 0.377 0.41 0.27 1122 1.9 0.143 
C-Arequipa 0.061 0.032 1.122 0.005 0.135 148.869 129 336 0.037 0.064 5.2 0.547 0.08 0.393 0.073 0.384 0.11 0.231 1122 1.2 0.148 
Cr-Arequipa 0.057 0.034 0.99 0.011 0.248 203.063 48 91 0.058 0.127 4.2 0.264 0.054 0.487 0.134 0.526 0.5 0.447 825 5.7 0.187 
C-Cusco 0.048 0.015 1.173 0.001 0.123 1560.900 129 400 0.031 0.054 5.2 0.593 0.085 0.356 0.073 0.323 0.11 0.157 1333 1.2 0.155 
C-Ica 0.169 0.001 0.876 0 0.173 1500.884 91 237 0.041 0.077 3.9 0.325 0.058 0.349 0.091 0.385 0 0.291 761 1.3 0.193 
Compartamos 0.01 0.028 5.128 0 0.391 113.787 182 317 0.064 0.155 1.7 0.61 0.21 1.016 0.262 0.573 0.5 0.421 292 2.8 0.341 
Confia 0.017 0.054 1.644 0 0.217 1909.873 99 256 0.075 0.132 6.3 0.498 0.059 0.49 0.125 0.385 0.65 0.296 890 1.3 0.13 
Confianza 0.048 0.053 0.863 0.018 0.235 2090.002 133 287 0.06 0.108 4.2 0.181 0.036 0.513 0.113 0.463 0.12 0.244 894 3.5 0.182 
C-Sullana 0.87 0.022 0.993 0.017 0.182 99.262 83 253 0.061 0.111 5.2 0.352 0.055 0.42 0.083 0.328 0.12 0.308 565 1.4 0.154 
C-Tacna 0.061 0.012 0.883 0.001 0.167 169.844 61 166 0.062 0.092 5.2 0.316 0.052 0.398 0.079 0.366 0.123 0.26 1004 1.3 0.154 
Cr-Tacna 0.094 0.007 0.941 0.01 0.223 2026.796 74 166 0.039 0.091 2.9 0.216 0.051 0.39 0.13 0.444 0 0.244 904 3.2 0.241 
C-Trujillo 0.052 0.028 0.94 0 0.159 134.940 68 192 0.038 0.074 5.8 0.441 0.067 0.367 0.079 0.354 0.054 0.326 885 1.3 0.141 
Diaconia-Frif 0.155 0.059 0.38 0.001 0.142 65.232 194 408 0 0 0 0.062 0.06 0.297 0.086 0.475 0 0.288 465 48.8 0.982 
D-Miro 0.009 0.016 1.885 0 0.322 97.713 157 421 0.019 0.062 0.6 0.171 0.119 0.607 0.186 0.374 0.64 0.505 310 2.3 0.581 
Edyficar 0.075 0.022 0.851 0.051 0.226 214.961 92 274 0.037 0.097 3 0.205 0.047 0.399 0.137 0.335 0.076 0.36 961 1.8 0.233 
Fie 0.069 0.058 1.263 0.015 0.114 149.430 98 242 0.027 0.063 6.3 0.156 0.021 0.24 0.065 0.405 0.515 0.3 1318 2.5 0.13 
Finamerica 0.113 0.02 0.29 0.004 0.198 165.682 90 257 0.046 0.083 5.9 -0.36 -0.049 0.271 0.103 0.350 0.144 0.228 833 1.3 0.136 
Fincomun 0.036 0.023 1.004 0.016 0.849 502.138 54 134 0.074 0.073 3.7 -0.019 -0.003 0.934 0.565 0.398 0.67 0.301 573 1.4 0.196 
Findesa 0.02 0.034 0.87 0.005 0.224 265.590 114 489 0.094 0.203 4.2 0.152 0.032 0.506 0.139 0.232 0.99 0.242 1147 14.5 0.187 
Nieborowski 0.036 0.039 0.729 0.005 0.151 1011.806 97 239 0.038 0.08 2.7 0.803 0.215 0.571 0.081 0.407 0.8 0.267 670 4.6 0.258 
Proempresa 0.105 0.07 0.794 0.012 0.269 238.407 107 292 0.053 0.108 3.6 0.05 0.011 0.498 0.129 0.368 0.032 0.338 889 2.8 0.208 
Pro-mujer 0.002 0.008 13.995 0.002 0.364 47.629 173 538 0.017 0.082 0.6 0.046 0.034 42.2 0.186 0.322 0 0.302 134 20.3 0.612 
W-Bogota 0.021 0.022 0.866 0.006 0.248 79.032 210 479 0.058 0.142 2.9 0.035 0.01 0.41 0.128 0.438 0.414 0.348 327 2.4 0.252 
W-
Bucaramanga 
0.008 0.012 1.008 0.002 0.241 510.437 296 629 0.067 0.143 2.9 0.039 0.011 0.449 0.114 0.471 0.509 0.388 218 2.2 0.249 
W-Cali 0.012 0.014 2.576 0.002 0.126 57.969 260 497 0.047 0.144 1.7 0.184 0.071 0.346 0.07 0.524 0.3 0.311 468 2.6 0.356 
W-Medellin 0.024 0.015 0.929 0.006 0.196 55.545 187 451 0.047 0.123 1.6 0.098 0.037 0.383 0.115 0.415 0.433 0.298 283 3.4 0.378 
W-Popayan 0.01 0.006 1 0 0.115 274.482 354 724 0.03 0.16 0.6 0.247 0.16 0.433 0.062 0.489 0.78 0.038 233 5.5 0.629 
 
Table 2. Values of the 21 ratios in 30 Latin American MFIs 
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Inputs Outputs 
A. Credit officers  (number) 1. Interest and fee income  ($ thousands) 
B. Operating expenses  ($ thousands) 2. Gross loan portfolio  ($ thousands) 
 3. Number of loans outstanding  (number) 
 
Table 3.  Inputs and outputs included in the DEA model, together with their units of 
measurement. 
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DMU Input A 
Credit officers 
Input B 
Operating 
expenses 
Output  1 
Interest and fee 
income 
Output  2 
Gross loan 
portfolio 
Output  3 
Number of loans 
outstanding 
Adopem 92 1,483.273 3,341 7,597 39,717
Andes 195 9,098.855 16,238 70,058 52,954
Bancosol 173 10,816.344 18,082 82,984 41,317
Calpia 130 9,190.205 12,038 52,550 46,856
C-Arequipa 211 10,017.945 26,015 78,985 85,929
Cr-Arequipa 67 1,157.664 2,045 5,035 7,053
C-Cusco 66 3,910.601 10,020 34,954 28,506
C-Ica 78 2,322.093 4,470 14,102 18,534
Compartamos 525 17,726.376 40,115 48,605 166,580
Confia 82 3,667.626 8,042 18,723 24,320
Confianza 23 1,201.438 2,217 5,890 7,233
C-Sullana 223 5,293.925 11,300 31,843 56,343
C-Tacna 111 3,012.012 6,191 18,464 21,327
Cr-Tacna 27 818.522 1,366 3,892 4,756
C-Trujillo 347 8,436.381 16,838 59,047 81,571
Diaconia-Frif 38 957.577 1,908 7,206 15,495
D-Miro 20 751.709 1,099 2,607 8,415
Edyficar 92 5,254.613 8,862 24,216 25,201
Fie 114 3,955.857 7,967 36,317 28,910
Finamerica 72 3,040.092 4,555 15,414 20,287
Fincomun 82 5,113.527 4,754 6,317 11,027
Findesa 23 2,627.744 5,371 12,894 11,243
Nieborowski 40 896.714 2,792 6,449 9,619
Proempresa 25 1,680.174 2,931 6,491 8,031
Pro-Mujer 65 1,676.766 1,762 4,682 34,973
W-Bogota 39 1,355.444 2,055 6,095 19,466
W-Bucaramanga 60 1,737.249 3,101 8,201 37,789
W-Cali 118 3,121.965 8,229 27,423 63,463
W-Medellin 39 922.768 1,792 4,971 17,979
W-Popayan 85 1,505.178 5,454 14,270 61,341
 
Table 4.  List of MFIs and the value of inputs and outputs 
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DMU A
1 
A
12
 
A
12
3 
A
13
 
A
2 
A
23
 
A
3 
A
B
1 
A
B
12
 
A
B
12
3 
A
B
13
 
A
B
2 
A
B
23
 
A
B
3 
B
1 
B
12
 
B
12
3 
B
13
 
B
2 
B
23
 
B
3 
Adopem 16 16 60 60 15 60 60 62 62 66 66 54 66 66 62 62 66 66 54 66 66 
Andes 36 64 64 48 64 64 38 66 85 85 66 85 85 38 49 81 81 49 81 81 14 
Bancosol 45 86 86 47 86 86 33 67 90 90 67 90 90 33 46 81 81 46 81 81 9 
Calpia 40 72 73 60 72 73 50 55 75 78 60 75 78 50 36 60 60 36 60 60 13 
C-Arequipa 53 67 76 71 67 76 56 97 97 97 97 87 88 56 72 83 83 72 83 83 21 
Cr-Arequipa 13 13 18 18 13 18 15 49 49 49 49 46 46 15 49 49 49 49 46 46 15 
C-Cusco 65 95 95 80 95 95 60 100 100 100 100 100 100 60 71 94 94 71 94 94 18 
C-Ica 24 32 42 39 32 42 33 64 66 66 64 66 66 33 53 64 64 53 64 64 20 
Compartamos 33 33 52 52 16 45 44 78 78 78 78 30 45 44 62 62 62 62 29 29 23 
Confia 42 42 53 53 41 52 41 81 81 81 81 56 57 41 61 61 61 61 54 54 16 
Confianza 41 46 57 55 46 57 44 70 70 70 70 55 60 44 51 52 52 51 52 52 15 
C-Sullana 22 26 41 40 26 41 35 66 66 66 66 65 65 35 59 63 63 59 63 63 26 
C-Tacna 24 30 35 33 30 35 27 66 67 67 66 66 66 27 57 65 65 57 65 65 17 
Cr-Tacna 22 26 32 31 26 32 25 56 56 56 56 52 52 25 46 50 50 46 50 50 14 
C-Trujillo 21 30 41 37 30 41 32 62 75 75 62 75 75 32 55 74 74 55 74 74 24 
Diaconia-Frif 22 34 63 59 34 63 56 63 81 81 63 81 81 56 55 79 79 55 79 79 40 
D-Miro 24 24 61 61 23 61 58 52 52 61 61 38 61 58 40 40 40 40 37 37 27 
Edyficar 41 47 52 50 47 52 38 65 65 65 65 51 56 38 47 49 49 47 49 49 12 
Fie 30 57 57 43 57 57 35 70 100 100 70 100 100 35 56 97 97 56 97 97 18 
Finamerica 27 38 50 45 38 50 39 55 56 56 55 56 56 39 41 53 53 41 53 53 16 
Fincomun 25 25 26 26 14 22 19 37 37 37 37 14 22 19 26 26 26 26 13 13 5 
Findesa 100 100 100 100 100 100 68 100 100 100 100 100 100 68 56 56 56 56 52 52 11 
Nieborowski 30 30 41 41 29 41 33 94 94 94 94 77 77 33 86 86 86 86 76 76 26 
Proempresa 50 50 59 59 46 58 44 71 71 72 72 48 60 44 48 48 48 48 41 41 12 
Pro-Mujer 12 13 74 74 13 74 74 33 33 74 74 30 74 74 29 29 51 51 29 51 51 
W-Bogota 23 28 72 70 28 72 69 53 53 72 70 49 72 69 42 47 47 42 47 47 35 
W-Bucaramanga 22 24 87 87 24 87 87 59 59 87 87 51 87 87 49 50 53 53 50 53 53 
W-Cali 30 41 82 78 41 82 74 84 95 95 84 95 95 74 73 93 93 73 93 93 50 
W-Medellin 20 23 65 65 23 65 64 60 60 65 65 58 65 64 54 57 57 54 57 57 48 
W-Popayan 28 30 100 100 30 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 5. The 30 MFIs Efficiency results under the 21 specifications. The column in bold is the 
specification containing all the inputs and all the outputs. 
 
 33 
 
Model  PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 
AB123 0.946 -0.041 0.059 0.008 
AB23 0.914 0.028 0.058 -0.316 
AB12 0.883 -0.394 -0.038 0.136 
AB2 0.879 -0.352 -0.064 -0.218 
AB13 0.854 0.188 0.080 0.396 
B123 0.843 -0.245 -0.415 -0.163 
AB1 0.832 -0.216 -0.031 0.497 
B12 0.823 -0.341 -0.407 -0.112 
B23 0.818 -0.206 -0.377 -0.349 
B2 0.811 -0.312 -0.361 -0.298 
A23 0.796 0.387 0.413 -0.178 
A123 0.788 0.395 0.426 -0.147 
B13 0.738 0.134 -0.521 0.380 
B1 0.736 -0.015 -0.515 0.416 
A13 0.696 0.609 0.361 0.065 
A2 0.621 -0.476 0.599 -0.116 
AB3 0.578 0.800 0.117 -0.054 
A3 0.584 0.793 0.129 -0.055 
B3 0.376 0.775 -0.458 -0.080 
A1 0.516 -0.323 0.697 0.345 
A12 0.589 -0.490 0.626 -0.048 
 
 
Table 6. DEA component loadings matrix. 
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Model Directional cosines F Adj R2 
 g1 g  2 g  3 g  4   
A1 0.09 -0.06 0.12 0.06 243.19 0.971 
 (16.30)** (-10.20)** (22.01)** (10.91)**   
A12 0.14 -0.11 0.15 -0.01 330.95 0.978 
 (21.64)** (-18.00)** (22.99)** (-1.76)   
A123 0.17 0.08 0.09 -0.03 307.00 0.977 
 (27.90)** (13.98)** (15.07)** (-5.21)**   
A13 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.01 691.59 0.990 
 (36.79)** (32.20)** (19.09)** (3.46)*   
A2 0.15 -0.11 0.14 -0.03 398.28 0.982 
 (24.98)** (-19.15)** (24.09)** (-4.68)**   
A23 0.17 0.08 0.09 -0.04 432.07 0.983 
 (33.34)** (16.20)** (17.30)** (-7.44)**   
A3 0.12 0.16 0.03 -0.01 620.98 0.988 
 (29.28)** (39.71)** (6.48)** (-2.74)   
AB1 0.15 -0.04 -0.01 0.09 466.47 0.987 
 (36.18)** (-9.39)** (-1.34) (21.61)**   
AB12 0.17 -0.08 -0.01 0.03 132.07 0.948 
 (20.77)** (-9.26)** (-0.89) (3.20)*   
AB123 0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.00 55.93 0.883 
 (14.91)** (-0.64) (0.93) (0.13)   
AB13 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.06 80.48 0.916 
 (15.91)** (3.50)* (1.49) (7.37)**   
AB2 0.20 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 112.06 0.939 
 (19.11)** (-7.65)** (-1.39) (-4.74)**   
AB23 0.17 0.01 0.01 -0.06 97.85 0.930 
 (18.65)** (0.58) (1.18) (-6.46)**   
AB3 0.12 0.16 0.02 -0.01 690.00 0.990 
 (30.52)** (42.22)** (6.18)** (-2.87)**   
B1 0.11 0.00 -0.08 0.06 307.43 0.977 
 (26.07)** (-0.54) (-18.24)** (14.74)**   
B12 0.16 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 211.64 0.967 
 (24.29)** (-10.05)** (-12.01)** (-3.32)*   
B123 0.15 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 193.16 0.964 
 (23.79)** (-6.91)** (-11.73)** (-4.60)*   
B13 0.11 0.02 -0.08 0.06 264.74 0.973 
 (24.28)** (4.40)* (-17.14)** (12.50)**   
B2 0.17 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 244.50 0.971 
 (25.69)** (-9.89)** (-11.44)** (-9.44)**   
B23 0.17 -0.04)** -0.08 -0.07 258.94 0.973 
 (26.65)** (-6.72)** (-12.28)** (-11.38)**   
B3 0.08 0.16 -0.09 -0.02 142.26 0.951 
 (9.15)** (18.89)** (-11.16)** (-1.95)   
 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. * Significant at the 0.05 level 
Table 7.  Pro-Fit Analysis. Linear regression results 
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 PC 1 ratios PC 2 ratios PC 3 ratios PC 4 ratios PC 5 ratios PC 6 ratios PC 7 ratios PC 8 ratios 
PC 1 DEA 0.099 -0.528** 0.612** -0.208 -0.014 0.216 0.232 0.003 
PC 2 DEA 0.876** 0.125 -0.044 -0.292 -0.101 -0.103 -0.044 -0.035 
PC 3 DEA -0.205 0.215 -0.250 -0.357 -0.008 0.324 0.168 0.027 
PC 4 DEA 0.057 0.507** 0.446** 0.359 -0.053 -0.004 0.087 0.344 
 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (bilateral) 
Table 8. Pearson correlation coefficients between PC from ratios and PC from DEA 
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Figure 1. PC1 versus PC2. Profit lines.  
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Figure 3. PC 1 versus PC 4. Country effect 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Some of the data had to be deduced from the Microrate source as follows: 
 
A: Credit officers 
Credit officers=Number of clients outstanding/Number of clients per credit officer 
 
B: Operating expense 
Operating expense= (Total operating expense/average gross portfolio)*average gross portfolio 
To obtain the average gross portfolio, we take the gross portfolio data from adjusted comparison table 
2002 and 2003.  
 
Outputs data was directly taken from the adjusted comparison table 
 
